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As we remember the hopes that accom-panied some of the programs that enter 
into Peter Schuck’s catalog of US domestic 
policy failures, reading his Why Government 
Fails So Often is enormously depressing. 
So voluminous is the list of failures that 
his assessment of the success of the Social 
Security System (pp. 337–39) brought a 
measure of cheer. We say this in spite of 
whatever reservations we share with him 
about the long-term solvency of the system. 
On Schuck’s terms, Social Security works for 
now. Most of the other policies he discusses 
do not pass this bar. 
Perhaps surprisingly, given the title of his 
book, Schuck’s research will not delight the 
believer in limited government who also 
believes in reform. Nor, however, will it please 
those who count themselves as progressives. 
His is a brave book that closely examines 
what policy measures try to do and what 
they actually accomplish. It is rooted in “the 
real world outside Washington DC” (p. 229), 
unvarnished and difficult to change as that 
is. Schuck’s criteria for policy success are 
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modest: “whether a policy’s benefits exceed 
its costs and whether it is  cost-effective” 
(p. 41). He is a self-described “melioristic 
realist” (p. 26), a pragmatist whose conclu-
sions emerge from wide and careful obser-
vation of policy outcomes. A major theme of 
Schuck’s study is that whatever reform one 
might propose will be hostage to the same 
problems that plague the original policy. 
Hence, he favors reform at the margin, as 
opposed to reconstruction and overhaul.
Schuck’s examination is both wide, 
encompassing a long historical swath of pol-
icy, and detailed. To make even his short 
list of successes, he reaches far back in 
history to the Homestead and the Morrill 
Acts of 1862 (pp. 331–37) before consider-
ing the Social Security Act of 1935. Yet he 
does not  presume to be exhaustive in his 
examination of government policy. Schuck 
limits the treatment to domestic national 
policies; state and local government thus are 
removed from the examination. So, too, is 
foreign policy. 
Why Government Fails consequently 
omits significant examples of government 
failure. Eugenic policy—especially “neg-
ative” eugenic measures—must count as a 
policy disaster; yet since sterilization laws 
were implemented by states, they fall out-
side Schuck’s compendium.1 It is perhaps 
worth noting that forced sterilization rep-
resents a failure at a deeper level than that 
of the cost–benefit calculus to which Schuck 
adheres. His cost–benefit analysis, citing 
the tradition of Kaldor–Hicks, depends 
upon the possibility of compensation for 
1 Schuck’s study does, however, encompass immigration 
policy and here might have noted the historical connections 
with eugenic theorizing. In their study of Jewish immigra-
tion, the statisticians Karl Pearson and Margaret Moul 
asked “What purpose would there be in endeavouring to 
legislate for a superior breed of men, if at any moment it 
could be swamped by the influx of immigrants of an infe-
rior race, hastening to profit by the higher civilisation of an 
improved humanity?” (Pearson and Moul 1925, p. 7)
harms (p. 44), but what possible compensa-
tion could there be for children who would 
never be born? In addition, Kaldor–Hicks 
compensation is imagined to take place in 
monetary units so that all goals collapse to 
one. We shall return to the specification of 
unitary goals below.
The subtitle of the book, And How It 
Can Do Better, frames Schuck’s reformist 
agenda. His discussion of what can be done 
to improve matters is, if anything, more 
depressing than the compendium of failures 
itself. He divides the reasons for failure into 
“structural” causes—such as culture and 
institutions—and incentives. Most policy 
failures, he argues, are structural: “they grow 
out of a deeply entrenched policy process, a 
political culture, a perverse official incentive 
system, individual or collective irrationality, 
inadequate information, rigidity and inertia, 
lack of credibility, mismanagement, market 
dynamics, the inherent limits of law, imple-
mentation problems, and a weak bureau-
cratic system” (p. 372). 
The inescapable conclusion is that the 
probability of large-scale reform is nil. 
Nothing in the American system escapes 
blame. The Constitution was designed to 
encourage divided government. Republican 
government, as has been known for mil-
lennia, is plagued by faction. Democracy 
seems to depend on informed participants, 
but its students have known for centuries 
that information gaps and irregularities 
(pp. 161–72) and collective action problems 
persist (pp. 136–37). In separate chapters, 
Schuck discusses America’s long historical 
engagement with “localism” and individual 
choice (chapter 4), its “rights obsession” that 
“impoverishes political discourse” (p. 104), 
and markets that frequently confound and 
compete with policy choices (chapter 7). 
Such “cultural values,” he writes, “are con-
stitutionally inscribed and all are so deeply 
embedded in our national psyche that they 
are alterable, if at all, only slowly and at the 
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margins” (p. 374). Thus, the structural con-
text is not the most promising context for 
successful political action. Inertia persists 
in part because those who are in the system 
have no incentive to improve: “Congress is 
well aware of its poor reputation with the 
public,” for instance, yet it “shows no interest 
in reforming itself” (p. 380).
2. The Role of Economists
Schuck therefore enters the economist’s 
bailiwick with a laser-like focus on incen-
tives, an approach consistent with “cautious 
incremental” reform to the systems he pre-
dicts will, for the most part, persist (p. 372). 
Moral hazard comes in for special attention, 
especially in Schuck’s discussion of the roles 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the 
 subprime mortgage meltdown (pp. 141–42) 
and present and worsening problems asso-
ciated with student financial aid policies 
(pp.  261–66). In the case of Dodd–Frank, 
he finds that policymakers seem “to have 
learned the wrong lesson from this fiasco,” 
increasing “moral hazard by broadening 
Wall Street’s safety net” (p. 142). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, Schuck maintains that they 
would do well instead to attenuate or per-
haps not create moral hazard in the first 
place. For those programs that are inevita-
bly subject to moral hazard, he advocates 
cost sharing “adequate to assure that ben-
eficiaries have enough skin in the game to 
act responsibly, with the amounts scaled to 
what they can afford” (p. 383). Here, he also 
focuses on improved information flows as a 
means by which the public, and especially 
the poor public, might be better served by 
policy. Schuck cites research by Caroline 
Hoxby and Sarah Turner in support of 
cost-effective measures that provide infor-
mation to low-income college-ready stu-
dents (pp. 397–98). 
Another glimmer of hope is evident in 
Schuck’s lengthy discussion of Charles Wolf’s 
theory of “non-market failures” (Wolf 1979). 
We quote part of the passage:
The most important category of nonmarket 
failure is what he [Wolf] calls “internalities” 
(corresponding to the “externality”  problem 
in private markets.) Internalities are the pri-
vate goals that apply within non-market orga-
nizations to guide, regulate, and evaluate the 
performance of agencies and their personnel. 
These goals are “private” . . . because they—
rather than, or at least in addition to the  
agency’s “public” purposes—provide the 
moti vation behind individual and collective  
behavior (p. 150).
This insight, along with the focus on 
incentives and information, opens the way 
for an additional positive contribution by 
economists. Perhaps a policy fails because 
it fails to align the private goals of acting 
individuals who administer the policy and 
those in the collective polity who establish 
the  administrating agencies on the basis of 
an articulation of public goals. Economists 
typically take Wolf’s “public” goals as moti-
vational forces, whereas they may neglect 
important private goals that counteract or 
confound the so-called “public” goals. To 
put this somewhat differently, if a policy is 
designed to address a “public” goal at the 
expense of the private hopes and desires of 
those who make up the collective, its fail-
ure may be altogether predictable, as those 
whose hopes and desires conflict with the 
policy are motivated to undermine the “pub-
lic” policy goal. Private actors may actively 
work to prevent the implementation of the 
policy or to avoid its consequences and the 
policy then “fails” because it is never imple-
mented as originally planned. Alternatively, 
as in the case of eugenics, the policy is forced 
into place and coercion is used to override 
the desires of a segment of the population 
in the name of a so-called “public” goal— 
“racial betterment.” In either case, the spec-
ification of the “public” goal is mismatched 
with private goals. 
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This is not a new insight. In 1961, James 
Buchanan explained to Kermit Gordon2 
that the difference between the econom-
ics tradition in which he participated, that 
of Frank Knight and his students, and the 
orthodox economics tradition to which he 
thought Gordon adhered, was that Knight, 
Buchanan, and their followers did not take 
group goals as exogenously determined. As is 
well known, Buchanan opposed the Kaldor–
Hicks approach to compensation by which all 
individual goals are collapsed into one exog-
enously determined goal (Buchanan 1959). 
George Stigler, who began his career steeped 
in the economics of Knight, remarked that to 
conclude that a decision is a mistake meant 
only that one failed to understand it, that 
is, the goal to which it was directed (Stigler 
1975, p. x). If economists misspecify group 
goals or posit group goals that are supposed 
to override individual ones, then policy “fail-
ure” might be a result of their misunder-
standing of the process they presumed to 
model. Such a modeling failure might well be 
independent of the US Constitution, democ-
racy, or any of the deep American cultural 
facts Schuck cites as explanations of failure. 
Indeed, if government failure were 
uniquely related to American institutions and 
culture, then there should be little or no pol-
icy failure when we move away from the US 
structural situation. This empirical question 
lies beyond the confines of Schuck’s already 
extensive treatment. He does,  however, 
2 Shortly after, Gordon would become a member 
of President John F. Kennedy’s Council of Economic 
Advisors. He was, at the time of the correspondence, 
Director of the Program for Economic Development and 
Administration at the Ford Foundation. Buchanan and his 
colleagues at the Thomas Jefferson Center applied in May 
1960 to the Ford Foundation for $1.14 million to support 
the Center. Buchanan, Warren Nutter, and University 
of Virginia president, Edgar Shannon, met with Ford 
Foundation officials on August 31, 1960. They were unsuc-
cessful in their attempt to obtain support. The application 
and related documents are reproduced in Levy and Peart 
2014. 
provide comparisons with Canada and 
Australia that are significant: there, adap-
tation to change was more rapid and, he 
argues, more conducive to obtaining highly 
skilled immigrants (p. 181). If inflexibility 
is a peculiar result of the American system, 
perhaps there are ways to emulate some of 
the flexibility associated with a parliamentary 
system.
To this fixation with the inflexibility of 
system one might add some evidence from 
nondemocratic regimes with centrally 
directed economies. When the Soviet Union 
was extant, many economists predicted 
that the Soviet economy would shortly sur-
pass the American. Students at the time 
were advised to learn Russian, as that was 
surely the language of future economists. 
American  economics textbooks published 
between 1960 and 1980 compared the sup-
posed growth rates of the US and Soviet 
economies,  relying on what we now know 
to be significant overstatements of Soviet 
growth. Textbooks that employed the pro-
duction possibility frontier as a device to 
compare American and Soviet growth rates 
claimed that Soviet growth outpaced that of 
the American economy year after year, and 
yet the size of the Soviet economy never 
caught up to the American. The textbooks 
did not call attention to this contradiction; 
it was pointed out decades after the fact. 
(We return to this failure to acknowledge 
disconfirming evidence when we discuss 
Schuck’s concern with types of reasoners.) 
By contrast, textbooks without the produc-
tion possibility model refrained from making 
predictions about the growth or size of the 
Soviet economy, so they did not contain this 
contradiction (Levy and Peart 2011). 
How does this example relate to the pub-
lic/private goal distinction noted above? The 
production possibility set in the textbooks 
described what was feasible for an economy 
in terms of public goals of plenty and power. 
When the economy is on the frontier of the 
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production possibility set, all of its resources 
are expended in pursuit of these public goals 
and there is nothing left for expenditure on 
the private goals referred to by Wolf and 
Schuck. The textbook modeling exercise 
assumed away all the (private) rent-seeking 
activity that enriched some of the popula-
tion while it pushed the Soviet society into 
the interior of the production possibility set 
(Levy and Peart 2008). The failure of eugen-
ics provides a second example of how policy 
failed by neglecting private goals. 
The first thing for economists to do is to get 
the private goals right. Accordingly, Schuck 
pushes hard on incentives in his analysis and 
his suggestions for improvement focus on 
the incentives of the people directly affected 
by the policies in question. He rightly argues 
that those who design and implement policy 
would be well advised to take incentives into 
account. But those who implement policy 
also have private goals, and here perhaps 
another opportunity exists to reduce the 
instances and severity of policy failure. Like 
the Soviet rent seekers who lined their pock-
ets while consumers were unable to pur-
chase ordinary goods and services, those who 
design, recommend, or implement policy are 
also subject to incentives. If policy modelers 
fail to take these incentives into account, any 
policy may well be hijacked. 
Schuck rightly focuses on the “struc-
tural and endemic features” of the federal 
bureaucracy (p. 307), noting that there are 
sometimes sixty layers of decisionmakers 
and a vacuum of leadership in federal agen-
cies (pp. 318, 315). To these, we would add 
a nod to incentives of the bureaucrats and 
policy advisors themselves. When an agency 
is established, modelers need to inquire 
about the private goals of those who will fill 
the bureaus. Schuck and Wolf cite agency 
budgetary growth as a concern (p. 151), 
but using budgetary growth as an indicator 
of incentives run amok will produce mixed 
results. Agency growth may be the result of 
 successful rent-seeking behavior, but it may 
instead be the result of public approval of the 
mission and successful delivery of the service. 
Concern about budgets speaks to the usual 
considerations of income and status; how-
ever, if there is an ideological “mission creep” 
that, too, might push the agency beyond what 
elected policymakers imagined at the outset. 
The attempt to use public health procedures 
to regulate ammunition sales provides a case 
in point. The goals of those who staff the 
public health agencies may differ markedly 
from those who cast votes in congressional 
elections. Hawkins (2012) puzzles over the 
EPA’s reluctance to push ahead in this direc-
tion, although the propensity of voters to 
remove congressional gun control advocates 
seems obvious enough. 
3. The Role of Experts  
and Private Goals
Schuck discusses the role of the 
 securities-rating firms in the financial melt-
down (p. 61). This episode is a critical one for 
economists. It was, after all, economists who 
studied the performance of ratings in detail 
consequent to their use in New Deal bank-
ing policy (National Bureau of Economic 
Research 1941; Hickman 1958). The context 
was how to ensure against another bank-
ing collapse after the Great Depression. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt himself 
questioned whether it was good policy to 
insure all banks, sound and unsound.3 At 
the time, bond ratings were regarded as the 
means by which to distinguish sound from 
unsound investments. The first academic 
study of bond ratings (Harold 1938) docu-
mented the private incentives of the four 
3 At his first Presidential news conference, Roosevelt 
stated the problem with Federal insurance: “The general 
underlying thought behind the use of the word ‘guaran-
tee’ with respect to bank deposits is that you guarantee bad 
banks as well as good banks.” (Phillips 1995, p. 38).
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extant ratings agencies to bias their ratings 
upward. The principle is simple: no one 
complains about a rating that is too high. 
College teachers, who grade student work 
and occasionally referee journal articles, are 
familiar with the incentives.
To deal with the incentive to bias, 
Harold’s study offered the plausible heuris-
tic of using the minimum of the four ratings. 
Subsequently, the NBER study of the per-
formance of the ratings, commissioned by 
the FDIC, tabulated the universe of large US 
corporate bonds of the period and 10 percent 
of the smaller bonds (Hickman 1958.) The 
NBER analysts also worried about the ten-
dency to upward bias and they consequently 
devised a “composite” rating, the down-
ward-rounded median of multiple ratings.4 
What seems to have happened is that, 
because the rating agencies were initially not 
trusted to serve only the public goal of pro-
viding accurate ratings, precautions were put 
into place against the predicted upward bias. 
For decades thereafter, this worked well 
enough. But as the ratings became trusted 
over time, precautions against private goals 
fell away. By the onset of the financial crisis, 
it was common practice to shop for ratings 
and it became acceptable to rely on only one, 
the highest obtained. Analysts who had once 
used a worst-case estimate of the soundness 
of a security moved to the most optimistic 
estimate possible. The change seems to have 
happened without much public awareness 
or discussion of the incentives involved, and 
4 “When only one rating could be obtained for an issue, 
the coded value of that rating was used as the composite 
rating. If two ratings were available, the composite is the 
arithmetic mean of the coded values of the two, rounded 
downward in the event of a fractional value, to the next 
lower rating (i.e. grade II is the composite rating assigned 
an issue rated Aaa by Moody’s and A1 by Standard). For 
three ratings, the composite is the middle value of the array 
of coded ratings; for four values, it is the arithmetic mean 
of the middle two (rounded downward in the event of a 
split rating).” Hickman (1958, p. 143). 
hence the growing fragility of the system 
went largely unremarked.
As noted above, lack of information 
looms large in Schuck’s discussion of pol-
icy failures. He expresses deep skepticism 
about the role of the courts in any reform 
program because, as he sees it, judges are 
not experts; indeed, they are often ill-in-
formed about technical matters (p. 171). 
Such skepticism stands in contrast with 
Judge Richard Posner’s optimism (Posner 
1999a, 1999b) about the efficacy of a naïve 
jury advised by contending expert witnesses 
in determining monetary damages for civil 
matters. Of course, in Posner’s example, the 
contending experts are biased witnesses for 
their clients, but everyone involved is aware 
of the bias. The rule of discovery coupled 
with motivated examination creates a con-
siderable amount of transparency and, he 
argues, a more intense scrutiny than some-
times occurs in academic economics.5 As a 
consequence, the opinions of contending 
experts are sufficiently reliable and the jury 
might simply split the difference in their 
estimates of damages (Froeb and Kobayashi 
1996; Posner 1999a, p. 1539). 
In the expert witness case, the conjunction 
of competition, awareness of expert bias, and 
a procedure that offers the evidence to all 
parties suffices to yield trustworthy (unbi-
ased) results. Does such a conjunction exist 
outside the court system, in the world of pol-
icy recommendation and implementation? 
Schuck’s account suggests that it does not, 
presently. Perhaps one additional idea for 
reform is to make disputes about policy pro-
posals subject to such a process: advocates for 
and against a policy and required  disclosure 
5 Posner (1999b, p. 94): “expert evidence is subject 
to intense critical scrutiny. . . . In the case of econom-
ics, where the tradition of replicating previous studies is 
weaker than in the natural sciences, a study conducted for 
purposes of litigation is more likely to receive more intense 
scrutiny than an academic study, even one published in a 
refereed journal.”
673Levy and Peart: Learning from Failure
rules would allow the voting public to assess 
the contending cases contingent on richer 
information sets and with full knowledge of 
the incentive to bias. 
4. Conclusion
Early in his book, Schuck (pp. 57–58) cites 
Philip Tetlock’s Expert Political Judgment 
research on alternative styles of reasoning 
that, following Isaiah Berlin’s use of the 
fragment of the Greek poet Archilochos, 
he labels “hedgehogs” and “foxes” (Tetlock 
2005). Hedgehogs know one big thing, the 
trick that always works, and foxes know many 
things that rarely work.6 As Tetlock explains 
it, the problem with hedgehogs is that 
they are not equally open to disconfirming 
evidence.
Hedgehogs bear a strong family resemblance 
to high scorers on personality scales designed 
to measure needs for closure and structure—
the types of people who have been shown in 
experimental research to be more likely trivi-
alize evidence that undercuts their preconcep-
tions and to embrace evidence that reinforces 
their preconceptions (2005, p. 81).
Such “trivialized evidence” was apparent 
in the treatment, discussed above, of Soviet 
growth by some economists. When predic-
tions of Soviet growth failed to materialize, a 
wealth of confounding factors was provided 
to “explain” the failure of the prediction. 
Without knowledge of personality type or 
the ability to look back at events of earlier 
decades, how might economists use Tetlock’s 
insight? The issue of whether group goals 
can be taken as exogenous or not may pro-
vide the means by which to move from 
hidden psychological traits to observable 
models. If group goals are exogenous, the 
6 Guy Davenport provides an interpretative translation 
of the fragment of Archilochos: “Fox knows eleventythree 
tricks and still gets caught; Hedgehog knows one but it 
always works.” Davenport (1980, p. 57).
 implementation of policy is fundamentally 
an engineering calculus. But once the goals 
are taken as endogenous in an ill-understood 
process, as Wolf and those in the tradition of 
Knight suggest, then implementation is con-
tingent upon the shifting goals and ambigu-
ity pours into the analysis. 
For whom does the hedgehog’s trick 
always work? For the hedgehog, of course, 
but not always for the public who depends 
upon the hedgehog’s analysis. Short of econ-
omists becoming foxes, perhaps the best we 
can hope for is a world in which motivated 
hedgehogs compete with each other in some 
more transparent manner akin to expert wit-
nesses in civil litigation. 
Adam Smith was much struck by the dif-
ficulties inherent in formulating, much less 
implementing, public goals. He worried 
about how policy advocates—his famous 
phrase is the “man of system”—become so 
attached to their system that they ignore 
private goals in service to the system. In his 
view, and even more prominently in the rec-
ommendations of his two followers, James 
Mill and John Stuart Mill, public discourse 
may attenuate this problem by better align-
ing the incentives of the system makers 
to the private goals of those in the system 
(Peart and Levy 2015). Why Government 
Fails so Often demonstrates why the issue is 
even more critical now than it was in Smith’s 
time. Peter Schuck’s important book reminds 
us about the allure of expert judgments and 
the need for public discourse at each step 
along the traverse of policy formulation and 
implementation. 
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